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Summary 
This paper investigates the willingness to pay of a sample of residents of Bath, England, 
for a hypothetical program that promotes the production of renewable energy. Using 
choice experiments, we assess the preferences of respondents for a policy for the 
promotion of renewable energy that (i) contributes to the internalization of the external 
costs caused by fossil fuel technologies; (ii) affects the security of energy supply; (iii) 
has an impact on the employment in the energy sector; (iv) and leads to an increase in 
the electricity bill. Responses to the choice questions show that our respondents are in 
favour of a policy for renewable energy and that they attach a high value to a policy that 
brings private and public benefits in terms of climate change and energy security 
benefits. Our results therefore suggest that consumers are willing to pay a higher price 
for electricity in order to internalize the external costs in terms of energy security, 
climate change and air pollution caused by the production of electricity.  
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1.  Introduction and motivation 
Over the last fifteen years there has been a significant research effort in measuring the 
external costs caused by electricity production (ExternE 1998; Friedrich and Bickel, 2001; 
Krewitt, 2002; European Commission, 2003; Markandya, 2003; NewExt, 2004; ExternEPol, 
2005, European Commission, 2005). It is well established that air pollution, acid deposition, 
risk of accidents borne by the production of electricity have negative effects both on human 
health and on the environment. For example, human health is affected in terms of reduced life 
expectancy and respiratory hospital admissions, while the environment is affected through 
yield change of crops and global warming.  
Using a bottom-up impact pathway approach,
1 the team of researchers of ExternE has 
quantified in monetary terms most of the damages to human health and the environment 
caused by different fuels and technologies that generate electricity. The external costs 
estimates are substantial; for example, ExternEPol (2005) has estimated that the external costs 
are in the range of 1.6 – 5.8 c€/kWh for current fossil systems, with figures at the lower end 
for gas based generation technologies and the upper end for traditional coal technologies. The 
results of the ExternE research also indicate the importance of the effects in terms of human 
health and global warming: at the end of the 90s ExternE identified that health impacts 
comprised 98% of the external costs from SO2 and 100% of those from particulates (European 
Commission, 1999), with mortality impacts accounting for at least 80% of those health 
impacts. The costs associated specifically with global warming range widely and differ for 
fuel. The current phase of ExternE uses the abatement cost methodology for valuing the 
external costs of global warming because, according to ExternE, the current monetary 
                                                 
1 “The impact pathway assessment is a bottom-up-approach in which environmental benefits and costs are 
estimated by following the pathway from source emissions via quality changes of air, soil and water to physical 
impacts, before being expressed in monetary benefits and costs. The use of such a detailed bottom-up 
methodology – in contrast to earlier top-down approaches – is necessary, as external costs are highly site-
dependent (cf. local effects of pollutants) and as marginal (and not average) costs have to be calculated” 
(European Commission, 2003, page 8).  
   4
valuations of global warming externalities have not yet been satisfactory. ExternE has chosen 
the value of 19 €/tCO2 because that is the abatement cost in the EU implied by the 
commitment to the Kyoto protocol (European Commission, 2005).   
Economists would suggest that when externalities are present, markets are not efficient 
as long as these external costs are not internalized and economic agents do not take into 
account these costs. The internalization of the externalities caused by the production of 
electricity should therefore target different fuels and technologies in different ways, according 
to the externalities caused:  policy instruments, such as taxes, voluntary agreements, command 
and control measures or emission permits should target polluting fossil fuels, while subsidies 
could be used to stimulate the production of  renewable energies that have a lower impact in 
terms of external costs, but are more expensive than traditional fossil fuels in terms of private 
costs. Subsidies to support the production of renewable energy have also been proposed by the 
recent ‘Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection’ of the European 
Commission. The guidelines allow Member States to “grant operating aid [limited to a 
maximum of 5 c€/kWh] to new plants producing renewable energy that will be calculated on 
the basis of external costs avoided” (European Commission, 2001).  
A second major reason to stimulate the production of renewable energy comes from the 
increasing demand for electricity, and moreover a demand for secure electricity. Already ten 
years ago, in the White Paper on Energy Policy, the European Commission identified the 
security of energy supply as one of the objectives on energy policies (European Commission, 
1995). Two years later, with the White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan – 
Energy for the future: Renewable Sources of Energy (European Commission, 1997) – the 
European Commission highlighted the goal of doubling the share of renewable energy from 
6% to 12% in gross inland production by 2010 to cope with the increasing demand of energy. 
More recently, the Green Paper on Security of Energy Supply has tackled the growth in energy 
demand with measures to curb the growth in demand and manage the dependence on foreign   5
supply, by also fostering the development of less polluting energy sources (European 
Commission, 2000).    
The current debate on the promotion of renewable energy has focussed on the 
identification of the policy instruments that are more effective in stimulating the production of 
renewable energy. Given that the private, or internal, costs of producing electricity are higher 
for renewable energy than for fossil fuel energy, governments need to identify effective 
instruments to promote the production of renewable energy. Policy instruments currently in 
use in the European Union are either investment focused, such as rebates, tax incentives, 
competitive bidding design, or generation based, such as feed-in-tariffs, rate based incentives 
and tradable green certificates.
2  Whatever instrument is chosen, it is clear that either 
consumers or the tax payer will have to pay for the extra cost of producing renewable energy. 
The focus of this paper is on the characteristics of a policy for the promotion of 
renewable energy in the UK.  In 2002, the share of renewable electricity production in the UK 
was only about 3% and the government aim is to increase the share of consumption of 
renewable energy to 10% of UK electricity in 2010 (DTI, 2003). Another major target for the 
UK energy policy is to comply with the commitment under the Kyoto Protocol that requires 
the UK to reduce the greenhouse gases emissions by 12.5% below the 1990 levels during the 
period 2008-2012. The increase in the production of renewable electricity is highlighted in the 
UK Energy White Paper that reckons that “renewable energy will also play an important part 
in reducing carbon emissions, while also strengthening energy security” (DTI, 2003, page 11). 
The electricity supply industry has been liberalised in Great Britain in 1999 (Batley, 
2001); today consumers have the opportunity to decide their supplier and the mix of energy, 
whether traditional or ‘green’ electricity. This means that the demand for specifically 
renewable electricity might contribute to an increase in its production. As Ek (2002) points 
out, if people’s willingness to pay for renewable is positive then we can expect that an increase 
                                                 
2 For a review of the policy instruments for the promotion of renewable energy see ENER, 2002; Haas et al, 2004; 
Haas, 2001; Menanteau et al, 2003.    6
in its production would be welcome. In particular, it is essential to understand what people 
think about these changes since they are the ones primarily affected. This change in the supply 
of electricity can have major effects on the structure of society. To give some examples, the 
employment in the energy sector might be affected as well as the electricity bill.  
In this paper we investigate the perception and the willingness to pay of UK energy 
users for different characteristics of energy policies that stimulate the production of renewable 
energy by using choice experiments (Louviere et al, 2000). In a choice experiments-based 
survey, respondents are asked to choose between hypothetical public programs or commodities 
described by a set of attributes (see Hanley et al. 2001); hypothetical programs of commodities 
differ by the level that two or more attributes take. Respondents trade off the levels of the 
attributes of the programs or goods, one of which is usually its cost to the respondent, allowing 
researchers to infer the willingness to pay for public goods or programs and the implicit value 
of each attribute (see Hanley et al, 1998).  
  In our survey, we query 300 respondents in the city of Bath, England, on their 
preferences for different hypothetical policies for the promotion of renewable energy that (i) 
contribute to the internalization of the external costs caused by fossil fuel technologies; (ii) 
affect the security of energy supply; (iii) have an impact on the employment in the energy 
sector; (iv) and lead to an increase in the electricity bill.  
Past research has investigated consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for renewables 
focusing on environmental effects (Roe et al, 2001; Ek, 2002; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 
2002; Bergmann et al, 2006), on health effects (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997; Bergmann et 
al, 2006), and on social aspects (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997; Bergmann et al, 2006). Other 
studies have focused on renewable energy without directly emphasizing the impacts on 
environment, health or social aspects in the valuation questions (Farhar and Houston, 1996; 
Farhar, 1999; Zarnikau, 2003; Menges et al, 2005). Finally, a group of studies has focused on 
the value of security of energy supply, even though these studies are not directly linked to the   7
promotion of renewable energy (Hartman et al, 1991; Beenstock et al, 1998; Goett et al, 2000; 
de Nooij et al, 2005; Baarsma et al, 2005). To our knowledge, our study is the first to 
investigate consumers’ WTP for renewable energy that have an impact (i) on the 
internalization of the external costs of energy production in terms of reduced greenhouse gases 
emissions, (ii) on the security of energy supply, and (iii) on social aspects, such as the 
employment level in the energy sector.   This paper is also novel in this literature because it 
assesses the willingness to pay of electricity users for a program that increases the production 
of renewable energy and brings positive effects in terms of both public benefits and personal, 
ancillary benefits. While other studies have only looked at public benefits of promoting 
renewable energy, this study also investigates private benefits, in terms of personal health, that 
the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions brings (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 should be approximately here 
 
Surveying a sample of the population of Bath during the month of August 2005, we 
find that our respondents are willing to pay a higher price for electricity in order to promote the 
production of renewable energy. When we look at the attributes that describe a policy for the 
promotion of renewable energy, respondents are more sensitive to a policy that addresses 
climate change and internalizes the external costs by decreasing the emissions of greenhouse 
gases: our respondents are on average willing to pay, on a quarterly basis, £29.7 for a policy 
that, by increasing the production of renewable energy, contributes to decreasing the UK 
greenhouse gases emissions by 1% per year. Respondents are also willing to pay £0.36 for one 
minute of additional energy security per year and £0.02 for each additional employed in the 
electricity sector. Our results suggest that residents of Bath are quite sensitive to a program for 
the promotion of renewables and that they attach high value to a policy that brings high private 
and public benefits in terms of climate change and energy security.  The results of our study   8
also highlight that our respondents have a significantly higher WTP, of about one order of 
magnitude, for abating emissions than previous studies have found, suggesting that ancillary 
benefits play an important role in calculating the benefits of a reduction in greenhouse gases 
emissions.     
 
2.  Literature review 
Several studies have looked at the willingness to pay for renewables in the US relying 
on Contingent Valuation (CV) questions (Mitchell and Carson, 1989). Farhar and Houston 
(1996) report a survey of more than 700 research polls on willingness to pay for renewables in 
the US carried out between 1973 and 1996 and conclude that about 40% to 70% of 
respondents have a positive willingness to pay for renewable energy. On a second survey of 14 
different studies carried out between 1995 and 1997 in the US, Farhar (1999) finds that an 
average of 70% of respondents is willing to pay at least US$5 per month more on electricity 
bill. Using a mail questionnaire, Farhar and Coburn (1999) survey 206 homeowners among the 
population of married couple with annual income of $50,000 or higher in Colorado during the 
summer of 1998. Their WTP question asked the respondents to state what incremental monthly 
amount they were willing to pay among a set of five values plus the status quo. Only 21% said 
they were not willing to pay anything, while the median WTP fell between 2% and 5% 
increase in monthly electricity bill. Champ and Bishop (2001) use a mail questionnaire to elicit 
the WTP of 1,497 residents of Wisconsin for a voluntary pilot program to allow residents to 
purchase wind-generated electricity. Half of the sample that received a hypothetical WTP 
question that asked for a donation to support the program showed a mean WTP of US$ 101 a 
year; the other half of the sample, that actually received a real offer of purchasing wind energy, 
showed a mean WTP of US$ 59 a year. Wiser (2003) surveys 1,574 US residents who pay 
their own utility bill and finds that median WTP to switch to renewable energy is about US$3 a 
month.   9
In the UK, using a market survey, Fouquet (1998) finds that 20% of respondents are 
willing to pay a premium for renewables and 5% are even willing to pay a premium higher 
than 20%. Batley et al. (2001) survey by mail 742 residents of Leicester and find that 34% of 
respondents are willing to pay more for electricity generated from renewable sources. They 
also find that respondents are on average willing to pay 16.6% extra for renewable energy. 
Hanley and Nevin (1999) apply the CVM to a sample of 45 residents of North Assynt Estate in 
Scotland, a small community of 130 households to investigate their willingness to pay for three 
projects for renewable energy. They find that respondents are on average willing to pay £52, 
£26 and £55 a year respectively for a wind farm, a biomass scheme and a small scale hydro 
scheme.   
A second method widely used for assessing the WTP for renewable energy rely on 
choice modelling (Louviere et al, 2000; Hanley et al, 2001; Bateman et al, 2002). Roe et al. 
(2001) use choice experiments to survey 835 US residents in eight different cities and find that 
the median WTP across all population segments for an increase in renewable energy of 1% and 
a decrease of emissions of 1% ranges between US$0.11 and US$14.22 per year. The authors 
conclude that when such a reduction is achieved by substitution of renewable energy for fossil 
fuels, median WTP increases. Goett et al (2000) survey 1,205 electricity users in the US and 
find that, for hydro, customers are, on average, willing to pay 1.46 cents extra per kWh for a 
supplier that has 25% hydro power relative to a supplier with no renewables. Bergmann et al. 
(2006) analyse people’s opinion over the effects of an increase in renewable energy in 
Scotland using a mail questionnaire that employs choice experiments. The attributes taken into 
account were measures to prevent effects on landscape, on wildlife, on air pollution, the 
potential gain in jobs and the increase in the price of hypothetical policies. Answers to 211 
usable interviews indicate that households are willing to pay £14.40 a year to have renewable 
energy projects that have no increase in air pollution, but are not willing to pay anything for 
creating new long-term jobs related to renewable energy projects.     10
Choice experiments have also been used to assess the WTP for energy security. Using a 
mail survey of 12,409 households, Baarsma et al (2005) find that Dutch households are willing 
to pay €5 to avoid one outage of one hour per year. Goett et al (2000) find that customers are 
on average willing to pay 1.21 cents extra per kWh to reduce outages of one hour (from four 
30 minutes outages to two such outages) per year. Hartman et al (1991) use both CV and 
choice experiments to survey 1,500 US customers. From the CV part of the mail questionnaire 
they find that respondents are willing to pay a range of 1.64-2.95 US$ a month to avoid a one 
hour shortage a year. From the choice experiment section of the questionnaire, the authors 
assess that respondents are willing to pay $3.32 a month to improve the security of supply by 
four hours a year. Beenstock et al (1998) sample almost 3,000 Israeli households by using 
different mail questionnaires that employ contingent valuation and choice modelling. They 




3.  Structure of the questionnaire and survey administration 
A. Selection of the Attributes and conjoint choice questions 
In our choice experiments, the hypothetical policies for the promotion of renewable 
energy are described by four attributes:
4 (i) annual percentage reduction in greenhouse gases 
(GHG), (ii) length of shortages of energy supply, (iii) variation in the number of employed in 
the energy sector, (iv) and increase in the electricity bill. We focused on these four attributes 
because we were interested in understanding the trade-off between (i) the internalization of 
external costs causing damages to human health and the environment, (ii) the need of 
electricity for day to day activities, (iii) a social element always important in political 
                                                 
3 The total consumption of electricity in Israel in 2003 was 39,976 billion kWh. 
4 Bateman et al. (2002) suggest that not more than 4-5 attributes, including price, should be presented in a choice 
experiments-based questionnaire.   11
decisions, such as jobs creation/loss (iv) and finally the cost of the policy to understand the 
willingness to pay for renewable energy.  
In a choice experiments-based survey it is essential to present a realistic and clear 
description of the hypothetical program or good that the respondents are asked to value. This 
means that the attributes chosen to describe the policy for the promotion of renewable energy 
presented in the choice sets and their levels have to be realistic and consistent with the 
government policies, as well as relevant and understandable to respondents.  
In choosing the first attribute, the percentage reduction in GHG emissions, we were 
interested in selecting an attribute that would consider both the long term climate change 
impacts as well as internalize some of the associated external costs of local pollutants that 
cause damages to human health and the environment.
5 At first we wanted to use two separate 
attributes, one for human health effects of local air pollutants, and one for damages to the 
environment. However, after focus groups and one-on-one interviews, we decided to use only 
one attribute because participants felt that the two effects, on environment and on human 
health, were correlated.  Unfortunately this makes it difficult to separate the local pollution 
valuation of individuals from that of broader climate change benefits, except on the basis of 
the share of damages associated with each when GHG emissions are reduced by a given 
amount. 
The decision to use the annual percentage change in GHG emissions matches with the 
recent UK Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003) description of the potential benefits that renewable 
sources might bring to the internalization of the external costs. The UK set the target to 
decrease GHG emissions by 60% below the levels of 1990 by 2050. In order to reach this 
target, the UK need to reduce the emission of CO2 by at least 15 or 25 MtC before 2020 (DTI, 
                                                 
5 Local air pollution reduction associated with reductions in GHGs is called an ancillary benefit.  Studies for the 
UK and other countries show that such benefits are very policy and location specific, and vary between £2 and 
£334 per ton of carbon reduced, (DEFRA, 2002), and according to the OECD they could be as much as twice the 
climate change benefits (OECD, 2000).  
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2003). An increase in the share of renewable sources in the production of energy could bring a 
reduction of CO2 emissions of 3-5 MtC. This means that renewable energy can contribute to 
cut GHG emissions by 1% per year.
6 Therefore, the levels chosen for this attribute in the 
questionnaire are: 1%, 2% or 3% reduction in GHG emissions per year in the UK.
7, 8 
The second attribute presented is energy security. Insecurity of energy supply, in the 
form of sudden physical shortages, can disrupt the economic performance and social welfare 
of the country in the event of supply interruptions and/or large, unexpected short-term price 
increases (JESS, 2003). According to the UK Energy White Paper (DTI, 2003), the UK 
production of oil and gas will strongly decline in the next years and the UK will become a net 
importer of these resources. As a consequence, the UK will be more vulnerable to price 
fluctuations and interruption of supply. DTI (2005b) reports that over the year April 2004 to 
March 2005 the total number of customer interruptions in the UK was around 22 million, for a 
total number of customer minutes lost of 2,668.5 million. In 2001/02, UK customers suffered 
on average 85.5 minutes of power cuts during the year (JESS, 2003). These figures, combined 
with previous works on energy security (Hartman, 1991; Beenstock, 1998; Goett, 2000) and 
focus groups indications, suggested us to set the levels for energy security as follows: 30, 60, 
120 minutes black-out per year, being the business as usual scenario 90 minutes per year.
9 
The third attribute presented in the questionnaire is the one related to employment. As 
Bergmann et al. (2006) claim, employment is an essential aspect about changes in the structure 
                                                 
6 On the basis of UK current policies, including the full impact of the Climate Change Programme, UK carbon 
dioxide emissions might amount to some 135 MtC in 2020. A reduction of carbon emissions of 15-25 MtC by 
2020 would put the UK on course to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by some 60% by about 2050. Renewable 
energy, by contributing to a 3-5MtC cut in emissions by 2020, would therefore help in cutting emissions by 20%. 
This suggests that renewable energy might actually contribute to about 1% reduction in GHG emissions per year 
(DTI, 2003).   
7 Even though 3% might be a well too optimistic scenario, we felt it was necessary to have such a variation among 
the levels of this attribute so that respondents could better appreciate the different contribution of different 
hypothetical policies to GHG reductions.  
8 In preparing the questionnaire we were worried whether respondents would understand the differences between 
GHG reductions of 1, 2, and 3 percent, but in our focus groups we found that people did understand these 
differences.   
9 People may attach different values to energy shortages whether shortages are announced or not (Beenstock et al, 
1998; Baarsma et al, 2005.) Our questionnaire focuses on unannounced energy shortages, as in the UK the public 
has generally not been informed of forthcoming electricity black-outs.    13
of society due to new energy policies.  In our study, we assume that the increasing demand for 
renewable energy might increase the number of jobs in renewable energy sectors, but might 
decrease the number of jobs in the fossil fuel energy sectors. Moreover, being the private cost 
of renewable energy more expensive than fossil fuel energy, an increase of renewable energy 
might have macroeconomic consequences in the industry resulting in a total loss of jobs.
10 
Focus groups discussions suggested to set the following levels for the attribute “employment”: 
+1000 new jobs, -1000 jobs, and no new jobs in the energy sector in the UK. The values were 
calculated by assuming a hypothetical variation of about 0.5% of the total number of 
employees in the energy sector.
11  
In a choice experiment exercise, when the focus is on the marginal price of attributes 
and the willingness to pay for a hypothetical program or good, it is necessary to include a 
payment vehicle among the attributes. Following the literature (Fahar, 1999; Goett, 2000; 
Bergmann, 2006), we used the electricity bill as a payment mechanism for the policy to 
promote renewables. The levels of the electricity bill chosen are an increase by £6, £16, £25 
and £38 on the quarterly electricity bill paid by the respondents. These correspond to an 
increase by 10%, 25%, 40%, and 60% from the average electricity bill in the UK.
12  
In our choice experiments we included the ‘status quo’ or ‘do nothing’ option in each 
choice set to compare the stated preferences of our respondents with the current situation. Such 
a comparison is necessary when researchers want to compute the value (WTP) of each 
alternative policy (Hanley et al, 2001). Table 2 summarizes the attributes and their levels for 
the present study. 
In our conjoint choice questions, respondents are asked to indicate which they prefer 
between policy A and B and the status quo. To create the pairs of alternative hypothetical 
                                                 
10 Firms might face higher prices. This could lead to an increase in wages in such a way that the unemployment 
rate would need to increase to balance the effect.  
11 According to the Office for National Statistics (2005), the total number of employees in the Energy and Water 
Industry Sector in the UK during the second quarter of 2005 was 177,000. 
12 The average annual electricity bill in the UK according to the National Statistics is equal to £251 (DTI, 2005a; 
Table 2.2.2). The electricity consumption in 2003 was equal to 337.443 billion kWh (IEA, 2003).   14
policies, we first created the full factorial design, i.e., all of the possible combinations of 
attribute levels. This gave a total of 108 possible combinations of hypothetical policies. To 
reduce the number of possible combinations, we opted for a fractional factorial design 
(Louviere et al, 2000). We then randomly selected two of these alternatives, but discarded 
pairs containing dominated or identical alternatives.
13 At the end we prepared six different 
versions of the questionnaire with six choice experiments each. An example of choice 
experiment is shown on figure 1. 
 
Table 2 should be approximately here 
 
Figure 1 should be approximately here 
 
B. Structure of the Questionnaire and Survey Administration 
The questionnaire starts by presenting the topic of the survey: people’s opinions on 
hypothetical renewable energy policies. In the first part of the questionnaire, respondents face 
a group of warm-up questions aimed to investigate the level of knowledge of respondents on 
the friendliness of energy fuels. The second part prepares the respondents with the hypothetical 
policies: here we describe the four attributes that define the possible impacts of a policy for the 
promotion of renewables. Respondents are asked to focus only on the four attributes we 
consider and not to think of other elements that might characterize the impacts of a policy for 
renewable energy. The next section is the central part of the questionnaire with the six choice 
experiments. The fourth section presents some debriefing questions to verify whether the 
respondents considered all the attributes in their choices, or only one. The fifth part of the 
questionnaire collects the usual socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. At the end, 
                                                 
13 A dominated alternative is one that should obviously be less preferred to the other. For instance, if two projects 
are created that are identical in every respect except for the price, the project with the higher cost is dominated by 
the other. 
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the interviewers took note whether respondents seemed annoyed by the interview or seemed to 
not understand the choice exercise. 
The survey was administered in person to 300 respondents intercepted in shopping 
areas, public parks and other central areas of Bath, England, in July and August 2005 by 
professional interviewers who were instructed to interview an even number of men and women 
and to ensure given proportions of respondents in various age groups. To mitigate possible 
biases in the sample, interviewers were instructed to follow the common practice of stopping 
potential respondents every 7
th person passing by. We chose to interview people through in-
person interviews to guarantee a high quality in the answers. The budget constraint of this 
study limited our analysis to sample residents of Bath and North East Somerset. The results 
presented in this study should therefore be interpreted with caution: they are not representative 
of the UK population, but of the residents of a quite wealthy medium sized town of the South 
of the UK. 
 
4.  Economic Model and Econometric Model 
A. The willingness to pay for a policy for renewable energy 
Our statistical analysis of the responses to the choice questions is based on the random 
utility model (RUM). We posit that in each of the choice questions the respondent selects the 
alternative with the highest indirect utility. We assume that the indirect utility function is linear 
in parameters:  
(1)  ik ik k ik V ε β + + = β x 0 ,  
where i denotes the respondent, β0 is an alternative specific constant,
14 k denotes the 
alternative, and x is a 1×4 vector comprised of the four attributes: the annual GHG emissions 
                                                 
14 We add an alternative-A specific to model (1) to pick any effect not explained by the levels of the attributes that 
explains why respondents selected either the alternative on the left (for example, policy A) or the alternative on   16
reductions, the yearly minutes of energy shortages, the permanent impact on the energy job 
market, and the increase in the quarterly electricity bill.  β is a vector of unknown coefficients.  
If the error terms ε are independent and identically distributed and follow the type I 
extreme value distribution, the probability that the hypothetical policy k is selected out of K 
policies is: 





ij ik V V k chooses i resp
1
) exp( ) exp( ) . Pr( µ µ ,  
where µ is the scale parameter which is inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the 
error terms. Equation (2) is the contribution to the likelihood in a conditional logit model. In 








ik ik y L
11
ln ln π , 
where yik takes on a value of 1 if the respondent chooses k, 0 otherwise. The coefficients are 
estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method. The model described by (2) and 
(3) allows us to estimate the trade off between any two attributes and the willingness to pay for 









− = , 
where  k β ˆ is the utility from an extra unit of k. Divided by the price coefficient,  c β ˆ , it gives us 
the monetary value of the utility coming from an extra unit of k.  











− =  
Where x is the vector of the levels of attributes of policy k given to individual i. 
                                                                                                                                                          
the right (for example, policy B). See for example Louviere et al, 2000, Alberini et al, 2003, Bergland et al, in 
press.      17
We will use model (1) to test the findings by Bergman et al (in press) that in choosing a 
policy for the promotion of renewable energy, the impact on the job market does not matter 
(Hypothesis I). An insignificant sign of the coefficient of (JOBS) would accept Hypothesis I. 
The second hypothesis (Hypothesis II) of our model is that respondents value more the 
externalities on human health and the environment than energy disruptions. We claim that 
people are willing to pay more to avoid damages to human health and the environment than to 
avoid energy disruptions because past research on external costs of energy production has not 
given much attention to energy disruptions.
15 To test this hypothesis we will compare how 
much our respondents are willing to pay to avoid energy shortages, considering the average 
length of energy shortages of 90 minutes per year, with how much they are willing to pay to 
decrease GHG emissions from promoting renewables to comply with the DTI (2003) targets of 
reducing emissions by 60% below the levels of 1990 by 2050, which is roughly given by a 
GHG reduction of 1% a year.  
 
B. Heterogeneity among respondents and specific hypothesis 
The conditional logit model described by equations (2)-(3) is easily amended to allow 
for heterogeneity among the respondents. Specifically, one can form interaction terms between 
individual characteristics, such as age, gender, education, etc., and all or some of the attributes, 
and enter these interactions in the indirect utility function to test other specific hypotheses.
16 
Our Hypothesis III aims to investigate the internal validity of our responses. Therefore 
we add interaction terms between respondents’ income (INCOME) and the reduction of GHG 
emissions (GHGREDUC) and between (INCOME) and the length of energy shortages 
(BLACKOUT).  
                                                 
15 As reported in the introduction, ExternE has previously found that health impacts comprised 98% of the 
external costs from SO2 and 100% of those from particulates (European Commission (1999)), with mortality 
impacts accounting for at least 80% of those health impacts. Researchers of the ExternE team have only recently 
moved their attention also to energy shortages.   
16 Since respondents’ characteristics do not vary across alternative hypothetical policies, socio-demographic 
characteristics must be introduced as interaction terms with the attributes or the alternative specific constants.   18
In the literature on non-market valuation, researchers usually try to disentangle the 
components of the good being estimated into its use and non-use value components (see 
Freeman, 2003). For our good, a policy for the promotion of renewable energy, is quite 
difficult to identify the use value component. This would be related to the direct benefits that 
respondents receive by the policy, such as the improvement in their own health status, the 
conservation of the natural environment that they do visit, and especially the reduction in 
energy shortages in their own dwellings. Non-use components also seem likely to be very 
important for such a policy, given that most benefits will emerge in the long run. For example, 
future generations will be more likely to experience the benefits in terms of health and global 
warming of the cuts in GHG emissions. If the share of ancillary benefits from GHG reduction 
are of the order of 10% (OECD, 2000) then we can say, roughly, that 10% of the willingness to 
pay for renewables is partly for personal benefits (although even here others also gain from the 
reduction) and 90% is for the longer term benefits of future generations. 
Our fourth Hypothesis is therefore that respondents that have children are more willing 
to accept the policy for the promotion of renewables and are willing to pay more than those 
without children. To test this hypothesis, we add an interaction term between (GHGREDUC) 
and a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if a respondents has children, and 0 
otherwise (CHILD). To further test whether respondents that care for future generations have a 
higher willingness to pay for renewables, we add an interaction term between (BLACKOUT) 
and (CHILD). 
Finally, we wish to see whether the level of schooling or the membership in an 
environmental organization influence the WTP for renewables. We therefore expect both 
characteristics, being a member of an environmental organization (ENV_MEMBER) and 
having a college degree (COLLEGE), to positively affect WTP. Our Hypothesis V is that the 
coefficients of the interaction terms between (ENV_MEMBER)*(GHGREDUC) and   19
(COLLEGE)*(GHGREDUC) to be positive and significant. Table 3 summarizes the 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 3 should be approximately here 
 
To further accommodate for variation in taste among individuals and relaxing the IIA
17 
hypothesis implicit in the conditional logit model, we also estimate a more complex variant of 
model (2), which allows for the coefficients β to be random variables and to vary over the 
population with density  ) (β f . In the random-parameter logit model (Train, 2003), the utility 
function of equation (1) is augmented by a vector of parameters θ that takes into account of 
individual’s preference deviations with respect to the mean preference values expressed by the 
vector β:  
(6)  ik ik ik ik V ε β + + + = θ x β x 0 , 
where θ is a vector of deviations from the mean β parameters estimated. Clearly, estimation of 
the likelihood function based on (6) requires that assumptions be made about which 
coefficients are random, and about the joint distribution of these coefficients.  
 
5.  Results  
A. Description of the data 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for our sample and compares them with those for 
the population of Bath and North East Somerset, showing that the socio-demographics of our 
sample are for the most part very similar to those of the population of Bath and North East 
Somerset. Our sample tends to be slightly richer and younger than the population of Bath and 
North East Somerset. 
                                                 
17 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) states that the relative probability of choosing between any 
two alternatives is independent of all other alternatives (Haab and McConnell, 2002).   20
 
Table 4 should be approximately here 
 
Our average respondent is 35 years old, has an annual gross household income of about 
£37,000, and pays £70 per quarter on electricity bill.  The sample is well balanced in terms of 
gender, with about one quarter of our respondents having one or more children. About 22% of 
our respondents are members of an environmental organization, and almost 31% have electric 
heating.  
Our first order of business when analysing the data was to look at the first set of 
questions (warm up questions) where respondents were asked to state whether the different 
electricity fuels presented were environmental friendly or not. Results are reported in table 5. 
Eight different sources were presented. The results can be viewed in the light of the broad 
qualitative conclusions of ExternE (2003). The two sources with more uncertain answers are 
biomass and gas, probably due to a lack of knowledge of the sources itself, especially for 
biomass. Despite the quite positive consideration of nuclear power by ExternE, our 
respondents consider this source of energy highly hazardous for human health and the 
environment.  The explanation we received the most was related to the risk of accidents and 
the problems with the wastes.  
 
Table 5 should be approximately here  
 
The opinion over the other sources, oil, natural gas and wind power are confirmed by 
the external costs estimated by ExternE (2003). Hydro, solar and wind are generally 
considered environmentally friendly by our respondents, while oil and coal are deemed 
dangerous to human health and the environment by more than 90% of the respondents.   21
Before running our conditional logit model, we checked the quality of the responses. In 
a debriefing question, most respondents considered the choice experiments as easy: on a 1 to 5 
likert scale, where 1 mean very difficult and 5 very easy, the average value given by 
respondents is 4.16. To further check the quality of the responses, at the end of the 
questionnaire interviewers noted whether they thought that respondents understood the choice 
exercise or were annoyed during the interview. Only a few respondents seemed annoyed by the 
questionnaire, and only 13 respondents did not understand the choice experiments. We also 
check the percentages of respondents who always choose the alternative displayed on the left-
hand side of the card (alternative A hereafter), or the alternative displayed on the right-hand 
side of the card (alternative B hereafter), which may signal the presence of abnormal response 
patterns (Viscusi et al., 1991).  Only 1 respondent selected alternative A for all of the six 
choice questions included in the questionnaire, and no one selected always either alternative B 
or the status quo for all of the six choice questions. These preliminary observations suggest 
that the choice tasks were not prohibitive and were accepted by our respondents. 
 
B. Results from the Discrete Choice Models 
In this section, we report the results of the random parameter logit models and of the 
conditional logit models estimated by dropping the observations of 13 respondents who did not 
understand the choice exercises.  
We began with random-coefficient models, but found no evidence that coefficients are 
random, and subsequently ran conditional logits.
18 Therefore, we present here the results from 
the conditional logit model. The first specification of the model uses only the four attributes as 
independent variables and the alternative specific constants to take into account of the status 
quo effect (see Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003). Model 1 of table 6 shows that all coefficients 
                                                 
18 We experimented with log-normal distributions for all the coefficients. Since the coefficients on price and on 
blackout should be negative, we specified a lognormal distribution for the negative of this coefficient (Train, 
2003). In all cases the standard deviation of the coefficient was very small relative to the mean of the coefficient, 
was insignificant, and the model reduced to a conditional logit.   22
are significant at the 1% level and have the correct sign. The positive sign in GHGREDUCT 
and JOBS implies that our respondents are more likely to favour a policy that reduces the 
emissions of GHG and support the creation of new jobs. Model 1 allows us to reject 
Hypothesis I: Contrary to the findings by Bergmann et al (2006), our respondents are not 
indifferent to a policy for the promotion of renewables that affects the number of jobs in the 
energy market.  The negative sign in BLACKOUT means that our respondents shy away from 
policies that have longer electricity shortages, and the negative sign on PRICE also suggest 
that our respondents do not like a policy that entails higher energy prices, with all other 
characteristics of the policy remaining constant. The positive sign of the alternative specific 
constants suggests that our respondents do prefer a new policy for the promotion of renewable 
energy in comparison with the status quo. A Wald test of equality of coefficients for the two 
alternative specific constants does not reject the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients 
(Chi-squared=1.79) and confirms that our respondents did not systematically prefer alternative 
A over alternative B, or vice versa.  
Model 2 of table 6 controls for socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents by 
controlling for age, income, level of education, membership in environmental organizations, 
and whether the respondent has children or not. A Likelihood ratio test shows that Model 2 
outperforms Model 1 at the conventional levels (LR test = 76.244). When considering the level 
of income, we find that respondents with higher income are willing to pay more for the 
reduction in GHG emissions, as well as for decreasing the shortages of energy. These 
considerations provide us with reasons to not reject Hypothesis III: Our model is internally 
valid, being WTP increasing with income, while (AGE) is negatively associated with the 
number of jobs created in the energy market, but is not significant.  
Model 2 also provides evidence in support of Hypothesis IV: respondents with children 
have a higher WTP for a policy that stimulates the promotion of renewable energy. The 
interaction term between (CHILD) and (GHGREDUCTION) shows that respondents with   23
children are more responsive to a policy that internalize a higher percentage of GHG 
emissions; and the interaction between (CHILD) and (BLACKOUT) suggests that this group 
of respondents is willing to pay more than respondents without children for a policy that 
minimizes the minutes of energy shortages. These results suggest that our respondents do 
recognize the importance of a policy for the promotion for renewable energy and are willing to 
pay for the benefits that such a policy will entail also to future generations.  
 
Table 6 should be approximately here 
 
 
Model 2 provides little support in favour of Hypothesis V: having a college degree 
negatively affects the probability of choosing a policy that internalizes a higher percentage of 
GHG, while members of environmental organizations are more likely to select a policy that 
internalizes a higher percentage of GHG.  
Finally, to evaluate Hypothesis II, we need to look at the marginal prices of the 
attributes, as we do in the next section. 
 
C. Marginal Prices and Willingness to Pay 
Table 7 reports the implicit prices of the attributes used in the choice experiments. The 
standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. The second column presents the implicit 
prices for the model without interaction terms, Model 1, while the third column presents the 
implicit prices derived from Model 2, calculated at the mean values of the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents. As in the previous section we saw that Model 2 outperforms 
Model 1, our attention is for the results of Model 2.  This model shows that respondents are on 
average willing to pay in addition to their electricity bill: (i) £29.65 to decrease the GHG   24
emissions by 1% a year; (ii) £0.36 to decrease the shortages of energy by 1 minute a year; (iii) 
£0.02 to increase the permanent number of jobs in the energy sector by 1. 
 
Table 7 should be approximately here 
 
Model 2 can also be used to assess the marginal prices for different groups of 
respondents, according to their socio-demographic characteristics. For example, respondents 
with a college degree, with children and a membership in an environmental organization are 
willing to pay £45.54 (st. er. 10.49) in addition to their electricity bill for a policy that 
decreases the GHG emissions by 1%, while respondents with a college degree, no children and 
no membership in any environmental organization are willing to pay £9.77 (st. er. 3.96) for the 
same policy. Model 2 can also be used to study the impact of having children in valuing 
energy shortages: a respondent with children is willing to pay £0.52 (st. er. 0.13) in addition to 
his electricity bill for a policy that decreases energy shortages by 1 minute per year, while a 
respondent without children is willing to pay only £0.31 (st. er. 0.07) for the same policy. 
  Results from Model 2 can also be used to estimate the WTP for the effects of specific 
policies for the promotion of renewable energy. Table 8 reports the WTP for five different 
policies characterized by different effects on the reduction of GHG emissions, blackouts and 
employment in the energy sector. For example, our respondents are on average willing to pay 
about £32 for a policy for the promotion of renewables that reduces GHG emissions by 0.5% a 
year, limits energy shortages to 45 minutes per year and maintains the current level of 
employment in the energy sector.  
 
Table 8 should be approximately here   25
 
Comparing Policy D and Policy E helps to investigate whether our respondents 
consider more important to internalize external costs affecting human health and the 
environment than guaranteeing energy security (Hypothesis II). Policy D gives more 
importance to energy security, keeping the current level of reduction of GHG emissions, while 
Policy E gives more importance to the reduction of GHG emissions, keeping the current level 
of energy shortages; both policies keep the number of jobs in the energy sector constant. Our 
respondents are willing to pay about ₤22 for a policy that, even though does not improve on 
GHG emissions reductions, limits energy shortages to 30 minutes a year, while are willing to 
pay about ₤15 for a policy that decreases GHG emissions by 0.5% per year, but maintain the 
current level of energy shortages. This result seem to suggest that our respondents do consider 
energy security as an important externality and value an average reduction in energy shortages 
of  one hour per year more about 50% more than a decrease of 0.5% in GHG emissions.  
  It is also interesting to note that the prices of £22.11 for policy D and of £14.82 for 
policy E are the prices that make our respondents indifferent in a choice set that entails the two 
policies D, E and the status quo. By using equation (2) we can further calculate the probability 
of selecting policy D, if this was offered at £14.82. In this case, the probability of selecting 
policy D would become 37.4%, while both the status quo and policy E would be chosen with 
probability equal to 31.3%.  We can further see that by rising the minutes of blackout of policy 
D to 50, brings back the probabilities of selecting D, E or the status quo to 33.33% each. This 
suggests that our respondents would be indifferent to (i) paying £14.82 for a policy that would 
not cut the GHG emissions but would limits energy shortages to 50 minutes per year, (ii) 
paying £14.82 for a policy that would cut GHG emissions by 0.5% per year, but would make 
no efforts in reducing energy shortages, (iii) not paying any additional electricity bill increase   26
for maintaining the status quo. This simple example shows how Model 2 can be used for 
simulating policy scenarios. 
 
6.  Discussion and conclusions  
It is of considerable interest to policy makers to know how much more individuals are 
willing to pay for renewable energy than for fossil fuel energy. It is also of interest to know 
what they are paying for – whether it is a public good or whether there is an element of 
personal benefit associated with it. A number of studies in the UK and US have tried to elicit 
the additional value of renewable energy and have come up with figures ranging from one 
dollar a month to as much as $6.98 (2005US$). Translating this into reductions in carbon is an 
approximate exercise and comes up with estimates of $170 to $848 (2005US$) per year per 
country per ton. Details are given in Table 9 below.  In our study we find a willingness to pay 
equal to $5,162 for a ton of carbon. This value represents how much society in the UK is 
willing to pay every year for reducing carbon emissions by one ton of CO2.  These payments 
have to be seen as a payment for a public good if individuals make the ‘Cournot Nash’ 
assumption that only they are making the payment. In that case the additional benefits at the 
personal level are insignificant and the WTP is a gesture of social goodwill. This assumption 
may, however, be suspect. Perhaps individuals are assuming that the programs of shifting to 
renewable energy apply to society, in which case there could be important local pollution 
reduction benefits. 
In our study we explicitly assumed that the reduction being paid for was at the national 
level. Hence there is a public good benefit as well as some personal health benefit. If emissions 
of GHGs are reduced by one percent, so will associated particles and other health related 
pollutants and the individual will benefit. Of course, even here, as in the case of the previous 
studies, there is the potential for free-riding – to state a zero or very low WTP because a large   27
part of the benefits go to others. Notwithstanding this possibility, the figures of WTP in both 
sets of studies appear to be significant. Hence the extent of free riding behaviour appears to be 
limited. 
 
Table 9 should be approximately here 
 
How can these results be reconciled? There are a number of possible explanations.  First, 
our study includes private health benefits, which could be of considerable importance.  Studies 
of ancillary benefits suggest that such benefits are very policy and location specific, and vary 
between £2 and £334 per ton of carbon reduced, (DEFRA, 2002), and according to the OECD 
they could be as much as twice the climate change benefits (OECD, 2000). In that event half of 
the WTP could be for private health benefits of the GHG reductions. Second, our study took 
place about more than four years after the latest of the earlier studies. In that time awareness of 
the climate problem has grown and WTP may have risen considerably.  Third, our estimates 
come from a sample of residents of Bath, a quite wealthy area in the UK and may overstate the 
WTP of the UK population. Fourth, the higher willingness to pay for abating emissions in the 
UK compared to the results from the US studies might further be explained by the different 
preferences of the two societies for renewable energy programs and for the internalization of the 
GHG emissions, a result that mirrors the positions of the two national governments in climate 
change negotiations.   
Finally, it is interesting to see that our estimates for the value of 1 ton of CO2 abatement 
are considerably higher than the values found in studies that employ the abatement cost method. 
Most of the results in the abatement cost literature are in the range of 5 to 125 US$/tCO2, but 
they are also subject to high uncertainty (Tol, 2005). For the UK, in 2002, the Government 
Economic Service recommended an illustrative estimate for the social costs of carbon of 
£70/tCO2, within a range of £35 to £140/tCO2, for use in policy appraisal across Government. A   30
recent review by DEFRA (2004) suggests to update the estimates range at £12 - £260/tCO2 for 
emissions abated in 2010, but it also states that the current modelling reveals that estimates of 
the social cost of carbon span at least three orders of magnitude, from 0 to over 1000 £/tCO2, 
reflecting uncertainties in climate and impacts, coverage of sectors and extremes, and choices of 
decision variables. Our results, and the results presented on Table 9, indicate that studies that 
employ the WTP methodology find estimates for the values of CO2 emissions much higher than 
those based on the abatement cost method, suggesting that the benefits to society are substantial, 
especially when ancillary benefits are considered, as in our study.  
Other major results of interest from our study are the following: 
•  People are ready to pay little extra in order to increase renewable energy through policies 
that increase employment. Regarding this attribute, it seems that people are more 
concerned with the loss of jobs than with the gain of new ones. Interventions should, 
therefore, be careful with losing jobs.  We also note that this result is at odds with 
previous studies (see e.g. Bergmann et al, 2006).  
•  The WTP to avoid blackouts is in the range of £22 per hour (£0.37 per minute) and is 
much higher than previous studies that have figures in the range of £1-3 per hour.  We 
need to investigate further the reasons for this high value.  
  Even though the results from this study have some interesting characteristics, the work 
was constrained by a lack of budget and was limited to a sample of residents of the city of Bath. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to undertake wider research in order to understand public 
opinion over the issue and to promote policies generally accepted by society at a higher level.  
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Table 1. Categories of benefits covered by the program for the promotion of renewable energy 




Roe et al, 2001  No Yes  No  Yes 
Wiser, 2003  No Yes  No  Yes 
Goett et al, 2001  No Yes  No  Yes 
Batley et al, 2001  No  Yes  No  Yes 




Table 2. Attributes and their levels for the choice experiments 
Attribute  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4  Status quo 
Annual reduction in GHG emissions due to 
renewable energy increase  
( 3 levels) 





Annual length of electricity shortages in 
minutes 
(3 levels) 
30 60  120  - current level of 
black-outs 
Change in number of employees in the 
electricity sector  
(3 levels) 
+1000 -1000  0  - 
no employment 
change in the 
energy sector 
Increase in electricity bill in £  
(4 levels)  6 16  25  38 
no price increase 
in the electricity 
bill 
 
Table 3. Hypothesis tested with our model. 
Hypothesis Description 
I  In a policy for the promotion of renewable energy, the number of jobs created 
or lost does not matter. 
II  It is more important to internalize external costs affecting human health and the 
environment than guaranteeing energy security. 
III  Test the internal validity of the responses: WTP increases with income.  
IV  WTP is higher for respondents with children. 
V  Members of environmental organizations and a college degree positively affect 
the WTP for a policy for renewable energy  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable (acronym used in regressions) 
Sample average or 
percent (Standard 
deviation) 
Bath and North 
East Somerset 
Individual characteristics 
Age  35.75 
(12.52)  38.4
a 
Annual Income (in £) (INC)  37687.29 
(26528.63)  31,000
b 
Male 51.33%  48%
a 
Have a college degree  22.66%  25.90%
a 
Have children  25.66%   
Member of environmental organizations  22.29%   
Electricity bill (in £)  70.86 
(38.78)   
Electric heating  30.33%   
Choice experiments  
Ranking of the attributes     
GHG reduction ranked as 1
st   68.33%   
Number of jobs created/lost ranked as 1
st 16.67%   
Energy shortages ranked as 1
st 6.33%   
Electricity bill increase ranked as 1
st 8.67%   
Found the choice experiments difficult (1=very difficult; 5=very easy)  4.166 
(0.88)   
Considered all attributes in the choice questions  69.67%   
Attribute mostly considered…     
GHG reductions  21.67%   
Number of jobs created/lost  4.66%   
Energy shortages  1.67%   
Electricity bill increase  2.33%   
Interviewer debriefing questions 
Understood the choice questions  95.66%   
Annoyed by the questionnaire (1= very annoyed; 5=not annoyed at all)  4.47 
(0.68)   
a Source: National Neighbourhood Statistics - http://neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/home.do?$ph=60  
b Gross annul household income in the UK. Source: HMRC CACI Paycheck Model 2005. 
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Table 5. Are the following electricity sources environmentally friendly? 
Our survey   
YES NO  Don’t 
Know 
ExternE (2003) 
Biomass 38.00% 36.33% 24.67% 
“There are dozens of different biomass technologies, and depending 
on the care given on gas cleaning technologies, the biomass options 
can range from low to high external costs.” 
Nuclear 20.33% 70.33% 9.33% 
“Nuclear power in general generates low external costs, although 
the very low probability of accidents with very high consequences 
and the fuel cycle impacts are included. It is also a technology with 
very low greenhouse gas emissions.” 
Gas 31.00%  52.00%  17.00% 
“Gas-fired technologies are quite clean, with respect to classical 
pollutants, but their impact on climate change depends strongly on 
the efficiency of the technology.” 
Hydro 93.67% 3.00% 3.33% 
Hydropower exhibits low external costs of all systems, but they may 
increase on sites were higher direct emission of GHG from the 
surface of reservoir occurs (ExternE-Pol, 2005). 
Oil 3.33%  90.33%  6.33% 
Oil has high external costs due to air pollution with impacts on 
global warming and human health. Introduction of advanced 
technology (Combined Cycle) substantially reduces the external 
costs of fossil systems (ExternE-Pol, 2005).  
Solar 99.00%  0.67%  0.33%  “Photovoltaics is a very clean technology at the use stage, but has 
considerable life cycle impacts.” 
Wind 96.33%  3.33%  0.33% 
“Wind technologies are very environmental friendly with respect to 
emissions of "classical" pollutants (SO2, NOX , dust particles) and 
with respect to greenhouse gas emissions.”  
Coal 3.67%  92.67%  3.67% 
“Coal technologies carry the burden of their very high CO2 
emissions, even for new, more efficient technologies, and in 
addition cause quite high impacts due to the primary-secondary 
aerosols.”  
 
Table 6. Conditional logit model estimates 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
A_Alt.1  2.0498 12.90 2.1290 13.12 
A_Alt.2  1.9786 12.77 2.0488 12.95 
GHGREDUCTION  0.6804 7.29 0.4437 3.78 
BLACKOUT  -0.0088 -7.45 -0.0055 -3.09 
JOBS  0.0006 6.69 0.0007 4.98 
PRICE  -0.0224 -3.34 -0.0244 -3.58 
AGE*JOBS      -0.0046
a -1.33 
INCOME*BLACKOUT     -0.0006
b -1.70 
INCOME*GHGREDUCTION     0.0453
b 2.84 
ENV_MEMBER*GHGREDUCTION     0.4872  4.83 
COLLEGE*GHGREDUCTION     -0.3755  -4.02 
CHILD*GHGREDUCTION     0.3380  3.30 
CHILD*BLACKOUT     -0.0050  -2.38 
Loglikelihood  -1358.72 -1297.47 
Observations  1722 1692 
a The coefficient of (AGE*JOBS) has been multiplied by 1,000. 
b The coefficients of (INCOME*BLACKOUT) and (INCOME*GHGREDUCTION) have been multiplied by 
10,000. 
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Table 7. Implicit Prices in British Pounds (standard error in parenthesis) 














*** significant at the 1% level 
a calculated at the mean values of the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents  
 
Table 8. Willingness to pay for selected hypothetical policies in British Pounds 
  Policy A  Policy B  Policy C  Policy D  Policy E 
GHGREDUCTION  0.5% No  improvement  0.5% No  improvement  0.5% 
BLACKOUT  45min 60min  30min 30min  90min   
JOBS const  +  1,000  -  1,000  const  const 
WTP    32.19*** 34.78***  13.21*** 22.11***  14.82*** 
(standard  error) (6.29) (6.47)  (4.00) (4.76)  (2.75) 
   32
Table 9. Implied society’s WTP for reducing emissions by one ton of CO2 per year (all the prices are in 2005 US$). 
Study Country  Year of 





MTons of CO2 
reduction/year
d 
Implied WTP per ton CO2 
per year per country (in 2005 
US$) 
Roe et al, 2001  USA  1997 







Million  8.02 $170.15 




$3.31 per month  $4,552.6 
Million  17.77 $256.10 
Goett et al, 2001  USA  2000 
WTP for 25% 





$6.98 per month  $9,597.2 
Million  17.77 $539.87 








Million  3.12 $847.93 
Longo, Markandya and 
Petrucci, 2006  UK 2005 





month  $5,368 Million  1.04  $5,162 
a WTP for the median respondent leaving in the Northeast of the US, with high school degree and no environmental organization membership  
b WTP calculated as 16.6% increase in the electricity bill (DTI, 2003a). 
c Total WTP was calculated as (Households’ WTP)/(number of persons in a household)*(population of the country) 
d We calculated the MTons of CO2 reductions by year in the following way: 
for Roe et al, we considered a 1% reduction in US Mtons emissions from the 2001 levels: 5,500Mtons*0.01  
for Wiser et al, and Goett et al, we assumed that the proposed program would bring an increase of renewable energy of 2% per year, which is consistent with government 
programs of stimulation of renewable energy.  The figure of 17.7 Mtons comes from the CO2 contribution of one kWh of energy (0.00606) multiplied by the average kWh 
consumed in the US by each person (4922) multiplied by the number of citizens living in the US (298M), multiplied by 2%, the increase in annual renewable energy (see 
http://www.carbonfund.org/assumptions.php).  
for Batley et al, we assumed that the increase in renewable energy would lead to a 3% decrease in the 2001 levels of UK emissions: 104Mtons*0.03 (DTI, 2005) 
in our study, the total emissions reductions was calculated as: 104Mtons*0.01    
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Figure 1. Example of choice experiments question. 
Characteristics  Policy A  Policy B  Neither 
Greenhouse Gases 
emissions  3% reduction per year  1% reduction per year  no additional greenhouse 
gases emissions reduction 
Black-outs  30 min per year  60 min per year  current level of black-outs 
Employment  0 new jobs  -1,000 jobs  no employment change in 
the energy sector 
Price  £25 per quarter  £6.5 per quarter  no price increase in the 
electricity bill 
Which policy would 
you choose?       
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